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Abstract
This paper presents two alternatives to the traditional majority-voting equilibrium ap-
proach in an attempt to account for the existence of environmental taxes as opposed
to subsidies given that such taxes are regressive and that the income distribution is
skewed to the right. These are the probabilistic-voting model and Roemers (2001)
model of political competition with the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium(PUNE)
as the equilibrium solution concept. The economic model is calibrated on the basis
of the US data. The paper shows that while the majority-voting approach calls for a
massive subsidy, the PUNE approach leads to huge environmental taxes. Our tentative
results suggest that the probabilistic model, wherein parties assume that the proportion
of unbiased voters is the same in all categories of income, explains the observed US en-
ergy taxes the best. Alternatively, we can not reject the hypothesis that policymakers
follow a utilitarian objective.
Key words: Emission taxes, political competition, majority-equilibrium, PUNE.
JEL Classication: H23, D72.
1 Introduction
Energy taxes are often considered to be regressive. Poterba (1991) has esti-
mated that, with very few exceptions, expenditure shares decline with income
for polluting goods such as gasoline, fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity. In
light of this, and given the almost universally observed right-skewed income
distributions around the world, it is difficult to find a positive explanation for
the existence of such taxes.1 The traditional majority-voting equilibrium ap-
proach would call for a subsidy on these goods and not a tax: Unless deterred
by an excessive efficiency cost, the median voter would advocate a subsidy to
energy consumption as a means for income redistribution. Even more puz-
zling is that the costs of taxation affect only the voting citizens, whereas the
benefits that are environmental in nature are often shared globally (in terms
of reducing emissions). The associated free-rider problem makes the case for
taxation even weaker.
This puzzle points to a natural question: Are there political economy mod-
els that can explain the existence of positive energy taxes in the US? To this
end, we examine the predictions of three competing models for the deter-
mination of environmental taxes. These are the majority-voting model, the
probabilistic-voting model, and Roemer’s (2001) model of political competi-
tion, with the “Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium” (PUNE) as the equilib-
rium solution concept. We then contrast the predictions of these models with
an estimate of the energy taxes in the US.
The first model is the simple and most commonly-used majority-voting
model of Downs (1951). Within this setup, we study the cases where all citizens
vote, and where citizens differ in their probability of voting, so that the median
voter (as opposed to the “median citizen”) is decisive. The second model
is the probabilistic voting approach; see Persson and Tabellini (2000). This
framework posits that parties are purely office-motivated; citizens, on the other
hand, care not only for policies but also for the political parties that propose
the policies. That is, they may strictly prefer one party to another, even if the
parties propose identical policies. Preferences for a particular party, or what is
1Admittedly, voters may vote for a package of tax and expenditure policies wherein the
redistributive effects of energy taxes are offset through the expenditure side of the package.
In practice, however, one seldom observes voting over comprehensive tax design issues.
Instead, it is often piecemeal tax reform proposals that are put to vote. Voters are then
concerned only with the redistributive ramifications of the particular tax policy proposed.
See also Cremer et al. (2004b, 2007) who, while not considering a comprehensive package,
study a two-dimensional policy in which revenues from energy taxes are earmarked for
reduction of capital and labor income taxes.
commonly called “ideological biases,” differ in sign and size across individuals.
The parties, whose prior information is identical, know only the distribution
of the bias. The interesting aspect of this framework is its incorporation of
uncertainty regarding who votes for which party. Neither party would know for
certain what platform, and offered by which party, can muster the majority
of votes. If this uncertainty is “large enough”, an equilibrium exists for
a simultaneous and noncooperative game in party platforms between the two
parties; see Lindbeck andWeibull (1987). Moreover, this equilibrium is unique,
with both parties converging to the same platform.
The third model we study is the more sophisticated political competition
model of Roemer (2001) and his equilibrium solution concept of PUNE. In
this setting, two political parties compete in an election. Both parties si-
multaneously commit themselves to the policy they will implement if elected.
Individuals vote for the party whose policy they prefer; however, some elec-
toral uncertainty exists due to randomness in voters’ turnout. Parties choose
their platform through a bargaining process between two factions: the “oppor-
tunists” and the “militants”. Opportunists care only about the probability of
winning the election, while militants are only interested in the announced poli-
cies. The policy adopted by a party is required to be on the Pareto frontier
between the two factions. In other words, no feasible alternative is unani-
mously preferred to the current policy. This defines the parties’ preferences
over policies in the political competition game; a PUNE is simply a Nash
equilibrium of this game.
In the economic model we consider, individuals have identical Gorman-
polar form preferences over a (non-polluting) numeraire good and the polluting
good. The goods are produced by a linear technology subject to constant
returns to scale in a competitive environment. This is essentially the setup
we used in Cremer et al. (2004a). However, that paper used a traditional
majority-voting approach only, and the numerical illustrations were not based
on actual empirical data.2 Here, we provide numerical solutions for each of
2See also Cremer et al. (2004b, 2007) who study the determination of a two-dimensional
policy comprising a tax and a budgetary rule that specifies the ratio of capital to labor
income taxes. These papers, unlike Cremer et al. (2004a), follow a positive approach
to the determination of both policy instruments. Cremer et al. (2004b), faced with the
non-existence problem, resorts to two sequential voting procedures (with either policy being
determined first and the other later), as well as the Shepsle procedure, to arrive at a political
equilibrium. They find that (in most cases) the equilibrium corresponds to the preferences of
the “median individual”. This includes the prediction that all tax revenues must be rebated
solely through either wage subsidies or capital income subsidies. Actual policies, of course,
never display such a knife-edge property. Cremer et al. (2007) use the PUNE approach.
This gets rid of the knife-edge property of the budgetary rule, but viable equilibria continue
the three political frameworks we consider based on an economic model that
is calibrated for the US economy. Using data from the 2001 Panel Study for
Income Dynamics Survey, we estimate a bivariate lognormal distribution for
labor and asset incomes from the sample of the 6,877 households who reported
a nonzero income (whether labor or asset incomes) for the year 2000.
We consider an aggregate of energy-related consumption goods to repre-
sent the polluting good (fuel oil, gasoline, natural gas, kerosene, LPG and
electricity). To calibrate the demand function, we assume a price elasticity of
demand of −0.30, an income elasticity of demand of 0.41, and a ratio of aver-
age expenditure on energy to average income of 0.056.3 Pollution is measured
by carbon dioxide emissions, which are determined according to the carbon
content of each component and appropriately weighted. Our estimate of the
marginal social damage of the polluting good is based on a value of $50 for
the social marginal cost of a ton of carbon (based on the estimates reported
by the EPA).4
We show that the majority-voting equilibrium calls for a reduction in cur-
rent energy prices that ranges from 33% to 91% (all prices are stated relative
to the price of consumption goods). The failure of the median-voter model to
predict the existence of environmental taxes is one message of this paper. As
such, it lends further support to the empirical literature that questions the pre-
dictive power of the median-voter model, as represented by the median-income
citizen or voter. Romer and Rosenthal (1979), Mathis and Zech (1989), Turn-
bull and Mitias (1999), and Turnbull and Geon (2006), among others, have
argued that the median-voter model is not a good representation of political
equilibrium when political decision making is at governmental levels above
municipalities and school districts.5 .
Unlike majority-equilibrium voting, the probabilistic-voting and PUNE
to be characterized by subsidies.
3The elasticity figures are from the literature, see footnote 15 below. The figure for
energy consumption to income ratio is from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys, 2002.
4On the EPA website: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/guidance/top20faqexterchart.htm
5Romer and Rosenthal (1979) reviewed the empirical studies that existed until then to
determine if government expenditures could be explained by the preferences of the me-
dian voter, and answered the question negatively. Mathis and Zech (1989) use data on 36
Pennsylvania municipalities that voted for a home rule charter (a multi-dimensional issue)
during the 70s. They concluded that the median-voter hypothesis is not appropriate for
prediction when it comes to multi-dimensional issues. Turnbull and Mitias (1999) examined
county spending in five Midwestern states and also rejected the median-voter hypothesis.
Turnbull and Geon (2006) found that restricting home rule (i.e. imposing constitutional
constraints on local government behavior) increases the likelihood of the applicability of the
median-voter equilibrium.
models predict increasing the current energy taxes. The former calls for an
increase in the current energy prices of 10% to 120%, and the latter implies
increases that range from 63% to 122% (all expressed relative to consump-
tion goods). To put these predictions in perspective, observe that in 2000 the
combined federal and states’ taxes averaged to 37 cents per gallon constituting
25.2% of the average price of gasoline. When expressed relative to the con-
sumer price of consumption goods, the existing tax rate is about 17.4%. (In
2006, with the rise of gasoline prices, these figures fell to 15.6% and 7.8%).6.
2 The model
Consider an economy with two goods: a clean numeraire good and a polluting
good y. Production technologies are linear, and the producer price of y is set
at one. Consumers have identical Gorman-polar form preferences given by
v(q, I, Y ) = a(q) + b(q)I − ϕ(Y ), (1)
where q denotes the consumer price of y, I is disposable income, and Y is ag-
gregate consumption of y. The polluting good creates a negative “atmosphere
externality”, ϕ(Y ), with ϕ0(Y ) > 0, and ϕ00(Y ) > 0. We further assume that
a0(q) ≤ 0 and b0(q) ≤ 0. The demand for y is given by
y(q) = −∂v/∂q
∂v/∂I
= c(q) + d(q)I(θ), (2)
where c(q) = −a0(q)/b(q) > 0, and d(q) = −b0(q)/b(q) ≥ 0. The demand for y
is thus increasing in income except in the limiting case of b0(q) = 0 where we
have quasi-linear preferences.
Individuals are identified by a two-dimensional type parameter θ which
is distributed over H ⊂ IR2+, according to F (θ), with total population size
normalized at one. An individual of type θ has exogenous capital and labor
incomes, r(θ) and w(θ), and a total (before tax) income of m(θ) = r(θ)+w(θ).
Aggregate consumption of the polluting good is then equal to
Y =
Z
H
y(q)dF (θ) = y(q), (3)
so that total and average consumption levels are equal. A single individual’s
consumption of y does not impact Y .
6See the Calibration Section below.
The proceedsR(q) = (q−1)y(q) of the “pollution tax” are refunded through
reductions in labor and capital income taxes.7 For simplicity, pre-existing taxes
are not explicitly included. Refunds are then proportional to capital and labor
incomes, at rates gr and gw that may differ from each other (but are restricted
to be of the same sign). Consequently, the disposable income of individual θ
is given by
I(θ) = (1 + gr)r(θ) + (1 + gw)w(θ). (4)
The government’s budget constraint implies
R(q) ≡ (q − 1)y(q) = grr + gww, (5)
where r and w denote the average capital and labor incomes. Let
α =
gww
R(q)
= 1− grr
R(q)
, (6)
denote the proportion of tax proceeds that are refunded on the basis of wage
incomes. We shall refer to this parameter as the “budgetary rule”. The tax-
cum-refund policy is completely characterized by the two parameters q and
α.8 Throughout this paper we assume that the value of α is predetermined
and concentrate on the determination of q through the political process.
With α given, we have a one dimensional problem (the determination of
q) that has a majority-voting equilibrium and whose value one can calculate.9
Our main focus lies, however, in contrasting the traditional median-voter ap-
proach with two alternative models of the political process: the probabilistic
voting model and Roemer’s model of political competition with the “Party
Unanimity Nash Equilibrium” (PUNE) as equilibrium concept.
Before turning to the description of these two approaches, we first establish
a benchmark for the value of the environmental tax and then describe the
individual preferences of voters for this tax.
2.1 Optimal tax benchmark
To obtain the utilitarian optimum, write the sum of utilities as
W =
Z
H
v(q, I(θ), Y )dF (θ) = a(q) + b(q)I − ϕ(Y ),
7The tax (q− 1) is endogenous and not a priori restricted to be positive. Consequently,
negative “refunds” are not ruled out.
8To ensure that gw and gr are of the same sign, we set α ∈ [0, 1].
9Cremer et al. (2004a) prove existence as long as the income elasticity of demand for y
does not exceed a limiting number.
where I = (1+gr)r+(1+gw)w = r+w+R(q). Incorporating the government’s
budget constraint (5) in W , one obtains
W = a(q) + b(q)[m+R(q)]− ϕ(y(q)), (7)
where m = r +w denotes the average aggregate income. Expression (7) is in-
dependent of α because, with Gorman-polar form preferences and a utilitarian
objective, redistributive considerations do not matter: all individuals have a
constant marginal utility of income equal to b(q). MaximizingW with respect
to q, assuming an interior optimum, yields
qFB − 1 = ϕ
0(Y FB)
b(qFB)
> 0, (8)
where Y FB = y(qFB), and superscript FB stands for first-best.10 Thus (qFB−
1) is determined according to the traditional Pigouvian rule and equals the
marginal social damage.
2.2 The θ-type voter’s preferences for q
Incorporate the government’s budget constraint (5) in the θ-type’s indirect
utility function (1), using also equations (4) and (6), to obtain the reduced
indirect utility function,
V (q, α, θ) = a(q) + b(q)
£
m(θ) + δ(α, θ)R(q)
¤
− ϕ (y(q)) , (9)
where
δ(θ, α) ≡ (1− α)r
r
+ α
w
w
. (10)
The function δ(θ, α) specifies the proportion of total tax receipts that individ-
ual θ obtains in refunds.11 This proportion plays a crucial role in determining
a voter’s preferences over q. It is also the only channel through which α affects
V (q, α, θ).
Denote θ’s most-preferred value of q conditional on α by q∗(θ, α). Lemma
1 which is proved in the Appendix, characterizes q∗(θ, α):
10Cremer et al. (2004a) prove that the second-order condition for this problem is satisfied:
the problem has a unique solution at qFB, with the first derivative ofW being always positive
to the left of qFB and negative to its right. This implies that W is increasing everywhere
to the left of qFB and decreasing to its right, with qFB yielding the global maximum.
11The expression remains valid when q < 1 so that R(q) < 0. The function δ(θ, α)
then shows the ratio of θ’s income tax payments to the price subsidy he receives from the
consumption of the polluting good.
Lemma 1 (i) Let eq(δ,m)=argmaxq[a(q)+mb(q)+δb(q)R(q)−ϕ(y(q))]. Then
q∗(θ, α) = eq(δ(θ, α),m(θ)), so that q∗ depends on α only through δ.
(ii)
∂eq
∂δ
=
b(q) [R0(q)− d(q)R(q)]
−∂2V (q, α, θ)/∂q2 , (11)
∂eq
∂m
=
b0(q)
−∂2V (q, α, θ)/∂q2 ≤ 0. (12)
(iii) In the special case of quasi-linear preferences, and assuming R0(q) > 0,eq(δ,m) increases with δ so that q∗(θ, α) is increasing in r and w (for a given
value of α). Furthermore, we have
δ(θ, α) = 1⇒ q∗(θ, α) = qFB > 1,
δ(θ, α) > 1⇒ q∗(θ, α) > qFB > 1,
δ(θ, α) < 1⇒ q∗(θ, α) < qFB so that q∗(θ, α) ≷ 1.
This lemma signifies the importance of δ in determining if an individual θ
prefers the polluting good to be taxed or subsidized, and in the case of a tax,
whether the tax should exceed or fall short of the Pigouvian tax. This is best
seen with quasi-linear preferences. In this case, if δ = 1, the individual receives
a refund precisely equal to his tax payment. With no net monetary costs or
benefits, his most-preferred tax is the Pigouvian one. If δ > 1, taxation of
the polluting good confers a net monetary benefit on the individual, enticing
him to want a tax larger than the Pigouvian tax. Finally, if δ < 1, taxation
of the polluting good results in a net monetary loss for the individual. He
would then want a lower than Pigouvian tax. Whereas in the first two cases
the individual necessarily prefers a tax to a subsidy, in the third case he may
prefer either one. In particular, he prefers a subsidy to a tax (i.e., q∗ < 1),
if his net monetary loss exceeds the environmental benefit that results from a
positive tax.
The presence of income effects complicates this picture. It implies that eq
moves negatively with w and r through (12). It also negatively affects the size
of ∂eq/∂δ and may even make ∂eq/∂δ negative. The upshot is that the presence
of income effects has a dampening effect on a taxpayer’s most-desired tax level
(as compared to the case with no income effects).
3 Political equilibrium
In the remainder of the paper, we study the determination of q through the
political process for a given level of α. We look at three political solution
concepts. The first one is majority voting–a well known solution concept that
does not require any introductory comments. The second is the probabilistic-
voting model, which is somewhat less known; see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
The third concept, namely, “Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium” (PUNE), is
not that widely known; see Roemer (2001). To make the paper self-contained,
we give a brief presentation of these latter two equilibrium concepts.
3.1 Probabilistic voting
With probabilistic voting, parties are purely office-motivated. Citizens, on
the other hand, care not only for policies per se but also for the political
parties that propose the policies. That is, they may strictly prefer one party
to another even if the parties propose identical policies. Preferences for a
particular party, or what is commonly called “ideological biases,” differ in sign
and size across individuals. More precisely, one’s “type” is defined on the
basis of his characteristics other than his ideological bias (i.e., his wage and
capital income in our setting). Hence any given type θ may have biased and
unbiased voters. The distribution of biased (and unbiased) voters may differ
across types. The parties know only the distribution of the bias, where their
prior information is identical.
This setting implies some degree of uncertainty regarding who votes for
which party. Neither party would then know for certain what platform, and
offered by which party, can muster the majority of votes. Lindbeck andWeibull
(1987) show that if this uncertainty is “large enough”, i.e. if the variance of
the bias distribution that causes it is “large enough”, an equilibrium exists for
a simultaneous and noncooperative game in party platforms between the two
parties. They also prove that this equilibrium is unique, with both parties
converging to the same platform. The platform maximizes a weighted sum of
the citizens’ utilities, Z
H
φ(θ)V (q, α, θ)dF (θ), (13)
where φ(θ) denotes the density of unbiased citizens among those of type θ.
The intuition for this result is that since both parties propose the same policy,
the only voters who matter for winning an election are the unbiased swing
voters who are indifferent between voting for one party or the other. Thus,
within a type, only the density of the unbiased citizens matters, and parties
court these swing voters.
3.2 Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium
Two political parties compete in an election. Both parties simultaneously com-
mit themselves to the policy they will implement if elected. Individuals vote
for the party whose policy they prefer; turnout is random, however, which
causes some electoral uncertainty (as in probabilistic voting models). Par-
ties choose their platform through a bargaining process between two factions:
the “opportunists” and the “militants”. Opportunists care only about the
probability of winning the election, while militants are only interested in the
announced policies. The policy adopted by a party is required to be on the
Pareto frontier between the two factions. In other words, no feasible alterna-
tive is unanimously preferred to the current policy. This defines the parties’
preferences over policies in the political competition game; a PUNE is simply
a Nash equilibrium of this game. Note that it is the unanimity requirement
that makes deviations difficult, providing the crucial requirement that ensures
the existence of a (pure strategy) equilibrium.
To provide a formal definition of a PUNE, index the parties by i = L,R,
where L stands for the “Left” (Democrats in our calibrations) and R stands
for the “Right” (Republicans in our calibrations). The objective function of
the militants is given by
vi(q;α) =
Z
H
ωi(θ)V (q, α, θ)dF (θ), i = D,R, (14)
where ωi(θ) is the weight attributed by party i’s militants to individuals of type
θ. The probability that party i wins the election is denoted by πi(qi, qj;α);
where qi and qj, i 6= j = L,R, denote the prices proposed by the two parties.
This probability is the objective function of the opportunists. It is increasing
in the share of voters preferring qi to qj, and is determined by assuming that
each individual θ participates in the election with some probability. Further,
assume that when both parties offer the same policy, πL = πR = 1/2.We have:
Definition 1 A Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium is a pair of policies qL, qR ∈
IR+ such that for each i, j = L,R, i 6= j, no other policy q ∈ IR+ has the prop-
erty that, given qj, vi(q;α) ≥ vi(qi;α) and πi(q, qj;α) ≥ πi(qi, qj;α), where at
least one inequality is strict.
The most striking difference between PUNEs and probabilistic-voting equi-
libria is the absence of convergence to the same platform in the case of PUNEs.
Divergence between equilibrium platforms is a well-documented empirical re-
sult; see, for instance, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Poole and Rosenthal
(1984a,1984b) for the US, Hofferbert and Budge (1992) for the UK, and Hof-
ferbert and Klingemann (1990) for Germany.
4 Data and calibrations
Our objective is not just to characterize the political equilibria but also to
provide (at least illustrative) numerical estimates. To achieve this, we have to
specify and estimate the voters’ preferences and the distribution of incomes.
Moreover, to compute PUNEs, we have to determine the militants’ prefer-
ences in each party (i.e., the weights ωi(θ) that they use) and to construct the
winning probability functions πi (based on the probability that a voter of a
particular type would participate in the election). We explain below the proce-
dures we have used for these calculations. In the case of probabilistic voting,
one ideally wants data on the proportion of unbiased voters among citizens
with different income levels. Unable to find such data, we use a procedure
explained in Section 5.3 below.
Data on spending patterns and incomes are obtained from the 2001 Panel
Study for Income Dynamics Survey. The survey consists of a total of 7,406
households, of which we retain the 6,877 households who report a nonzero
(total) income in 2000.12 We fit a bivariate lognormal distribution for labor
and asset incomes to this truncated sample (while using the weights that the
survey assigns to each household.)13
To calculate the numerical values for the parameters of the individuals’
utility function a(q) and b(q), we first calibrate the parameters of the demand
function for energy. Given the Gorman-polar specification, we have y(q) =
−a0(q)/b(q)− [b0(q)/b(q)] I. To be able to gauge the importance of the income
effect through a single parameter, we assume that b(q) = 1− βq. This enables
us to rewrite the demand function as
y(q) =
−a0(q)
1− βq +
β
1− βqI.
To make things simple, we further assume that the first expression in the
right-hand side of above is linear in price and includes a constant term.14 In
12Specifically, we calculate labor income as the sum of labor income and the labor part
of business income of the Head of the household and his spouse. To calculate asset income,
we take the family’s reported income and subtract the calculated labor income, transfer
income, social security income, and the Head’s farm income.
13Recall that our model postulates that voters differ only in two dimensions: labor and as-
set incomes. The mean, median and standard deviation are $50,294, $36,100 and $64,825 for
labor incomes, and $9,632, $433, and $42,838 for asset incomes. The correlation coefficient
between labor and asset incomes is 0.163–a figure in line with the numerical calculation of
Champernowne and Cowell (1998) who report a correlation coefficient of 0.135 using 1985
PSID data.
14See the Appendix for details.
order to calculate the three parameters of the resulting equation, we must
first specify the nature of the polluting good. We take this to be “energy”
and define it as an aggregate of energy-related consumption goods (fuel oil,
gasoline, natural gas, kerosene, LPG, and electricity). We use three pieces of
information to pin down the values of the three parameters: the marginal
propensity to consume energy out of income (which on the basis of our data
is 2.25%, implying a value of 0.405 for the income elasticity of demand for the
“average consumer”), long-run price elasticity of demand (equal to −0.30),
and the ratio of average expenditure on energy to average income (equal to
0.0555, with an average income of $59, 926).15 All our calculations are based
on the assumption that the relative consumer price of a “unit” of energy is
equal to one. This normalization implies that all the predicted tax rates are
in addition to current taxes.
We assume that the disutility from pollution is given by
ϕ(Y ) = eh+kY .
We take the pollution generated by energy to be the release of carbon diox-
ide into the atmosphere. The carbon content of the polluting good is found
according to the carbon content of each appropriately-weighted component.
Using a value of $50 for the social marginal cost of a ton of carbon,16 we
calculate the marginal social damage of one unit of the polluting good. This
translates into a tax rate of about 10% on the polluting good. To set h and k
we choose the least convex function compatible with a Pigouvian tax of 10%
and a positive value for every household’s most-preferred q.
To calculate the PUNE tax rate, we must determine the weights that the
two parties’ militants assign to the preferences of each voter, ωi(θ) i = L,R.
We use a modified version of Bartels’ weights (2002), found by regressing the
observed roll call vote of senators on their constituents’ opinion (among other
variables) weighted by the income of the constituents, for these. Running
separate regressions for Democrats and Republicans, he estimates that the
15The −0.30 figure is based on existing estimates for the long run price elasticity of con-
sumer demand for energy. These vary from −0.35 to −0.15; see Branch (1993), Filippini
(1999), Gately and Huntington (2001), Hodge (1999), National Institute of Economics and
Industry Research (2002), and Ninomiya (2002). The 0.0555 figure is found from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Surveys, 2002, which report a value of 0.064 for the ratio of average
energy consumption to average annual expenditures; and 0.8667 for the ratio of average
net-of-tax to average gross-of-tax income. The $59, 926 value for average income comes
from the 2001 PSID data.
16This is within the range of estimated values of $5.5 to $187 on the EPA website. See
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/epp/guidance/top20faqexterchart.htm .
weight given to an individual with income I is −0.02 + 0.04I for Democrats
and −0.86 + 0.099I for Republicans. We modify these weights in two ways.
First, Bartels uses income data from 1990, while we use 2000. Consequently,
the coefficients on incomes have to be deflated. We do this by using the
variation in the Consumer Price Index between 1990 and 2000. Consequently,
we divide 0.04 and 0.099 above by 1.278. Second, we restrict the weights to
be nonnegative. For the Democrats, we simply set the constant part of ωL
at zero (instead of −0.02); and for the Republicans, we use max[0, ωR] rather
than ωR. We obtain
ωL = 0.031(w + r), (15)
ωR = max[0,−0.86 + 0.077(w + r)], (16)
which we use in the calculation of the PUNE tax rates.
To calculate the probability that a particular voter participates in the elec-
tion, we continue to rely on Bartels (2002), using his regression of turnout on
income. As with the voters’ weights, we modify his results (as reported in
his Table A6) on the basis of the consumer price indices for 1990 and 2000.
Moreover, given the linear specification between turnout and income, some pre-
cautions are necessary to ensure the probabilities are between 0 and 1. The
average turnout in the economy is then 72%, and the “average individual” (a
person with average income) votes with a probability of 75.5%.
To put the predictions of our three political economy models in perspec-
tive, we also calculate the current “tax rate” on energy in the US. Given
that the bulk of energy taxes in the US are fuel taxes, we approximate this
concept by the tax rate on gasoline. The Monthly Motor Fuel Reported by
States (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1999) reports the average gaso-
line tax in the US in March 2000 was 37 cents per gallon (consisting of a
federal tax of 18.4 cents and the weighted average of State taxes that ranged
from 7.5 cents in Georgia to 29.7 in New York). The U.S. Department
of Transportation also reports a weighted average price of $1.47 per gal-
lon of gasoline in 2000.17 These figures translate into a tax rate of 25.2%.
We also calculate, on the basis of “Comparison of state and local taxes”
(http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sl_sales.html), the weighted average of
sales tax rates in the US at 7.8%. Consequently, in the U.S., the relative tax
rate between gasoline and other goods was about 17.4% in the year 2000.18
17On the US Department of Transportation website, see
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/in5.htm and
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/mmfr/mmfrpage.htm.
18With the rise in gasoline prices during the past few years, the U.S. tax rates have
A final observation is in order. With the current consumer price of energy
normalized at 1, and q = 1.1 as the optimal price, we are assuming that none
of the existing energy taxes are levied for environmental concerns. This is of
course arbitrary, as any other assumption would be. All that one can observe
is a tax rate. What portion of it is levied for what purpose can never be known.
Our working assumption is based on the fact that the gasoline tax in the US
was introduced primarily for the purpose of financing road constructions and
upkeep, and earmarked for the highway trust fund. Moreover, environmental
concerns are rather new, while energy taxes have been in place for some time
now. In fact, notwithstanding the recent environmental concerns, the US
energy tax rates have been falling sharply over the past few years (caused by
the huge increases in the producer price of energy). Observe also that energy
taxes are particularly low in the US, as compared to most other industrialized
countries in Europe, as well as Canada and Japan. Finally, to the extent
that gasoline prices are raised by processing additives that are mandated for
environmental objectives, the added mark ups reflect “implicit” environmental
taxes but they are included in the producer price and do not raise tax revenues.
5 Results
We now determine the equilibrium tax rates for our three political economy
models, starting with the majority-voting.
5.1 The majority-voting equilibrium value of q
The preferences obtained from our calibrations are single-peaked in q, implying
existence of a classical, Downsian majority-voting equilibrium, given by the
median voter’s most-preferred value of q. In the special case of quasi-linear
preferences, it is easy to rank individuals according to q∗(θ, α), since Lemma
1, part (iii) has established that q∗(θ, α) is increasing in δ. Ranking is more
difficult in the presence of income effects, because as shown in Lemma 1,
declined. Using the same source, the average gasoline tax and price in the U.S. in September
2006 were 39 cents and $2.506 per gallon of gasoline. These translate into a tax rate of 15.6%,
equal to 7.8% when expressed relative to the consumer price of consumption goods.
The American Petroleum Institute (API, 2007) reports a higher average tax rate equal to
45.8 cents for March 2007. The difference with the U.S. Department of Transportaion figures
is due to API’s inclusion of “other State taxes,” which include “applicable sales taxes, gross
receipts taxes, oil inspection fees, underground storage tank fees and other miscellaneous
environmental fees”. Using API’s figures the current gasoline tax rate is 18.3%, equal to
10.5% when expressed relative to the consumer price of consumption goods.
q∗(θ, α) also depends (negatively) on m(θ). We have computed numerically
the majority-voting equilibrium value of q, denoted by qMC , and we report
the values of qMC − 1 as a function of α in the fourth row of Table 1. The
superscriptMC stands for “median citizen” defined on the basis of the citizens’
preferences for q. Specifically, 50% of the population prefer a q higher than
qMC and another 50% prefer a q lower than qMC . The case for which gw = gr,
i.e. when taxes or subsidies are proportional to total income regardless of
their source, is represented by α = 0.839. With our calibration, the direct
income effects are “small” enough, and the correlation between w and r is
large enough, to ensure that richer people have a higher most-preferred value
of q. Consequently, since the median wage and the median capital income are
smaller than their average counterparts, qMC < qFB for all values of α.
The determination of qMC is based on the assumption that all citizens
participate in the election with the same probability. As we noted in Section 4,
however, this is not the case empirically. Instead, turnout probability increases
with total income. With small income effects, this suggests that more than
50% of voters, as opposed to citizens, prefer q to be higher than qMC . We can
then determine a second value for the majority-voting equilibrium q which
takes the turnout probabilities into account. Denote this equilibrium by qMV
(MV stands for “median voter”). We obtain that qMV > qMC , and also in
Table 1 report the solutions for qMV − 1, conditional on different values of α.
Note that, as with qMC , for all values of 0 5 α 5 1, qMV < qFB. This occurs
because adjusting for turnout probabilities leaves the ratio of median income
to average income well below one, for both wage earners and capital owners.19
Observe also that qMC and qMV increase with α. In the absence of income
effects, a necessary and sufficient condition for this positive relationship is that
wage incomes are less positively skewed than capital incomes, so that the gap
between median and average is lower for wage income than for capital income.
We then find that the income effects present in our calibration are not large
enough to reverse this comparative statics result.
Table 1: Desired energy tax rates in addition to current rates
19Specifically, the ratio of median income to average income increases from 61% (for the
median citizen) to 73% (for median voter) in the case of wage incomes, and from 22%
(median citizen) to 26% (median voter) for capital incomes.
Values of α .000 .250 .500 .750 .839 1.000
Welfare maximizing: 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Majority voting:
-uniform voting prob. —91.0 —82.0 —67.0 —53.9 —51.0 —50.7
-nonuniform voting prob. —90.5 —79.4 —58.6 —38.5 —35.7 —33.4
PUNEs:
-Democrats 119.8 112.3 102.1 87.2 80.0 63.4
-Republicans 122.1 114.9 104.8 90.0 82.8 66.0
Probabilistic voting:
-same weight 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
-with turnout 39.1 37.0 34.9 32.7 31.9 30.5
-affine no intercept 119.8 112.3 102.1 87.2 80.0 63.4
-affine small intercept 118.5 110.9 100.6 85.6 78.5 62.0
-affine median intercept 115.9 108.2 97.7 82.6 75.5 59.3
-affine large intercept 109.0 100.8 90.0 74.9 68.0 52.7
5.2 The PUNEs
We now turn to the determination of PUNE tax rates in the voting game over q.
This requires us to examine the militants’ and the opportunists’ preferences for
q within each party. Consider first the utility of the militants, a weighted sum
of the citizens’ utilities. Let q∗L and q∗R denote the most-preferred values of q for
the militants of the Left and the Right party (Democrats and Republicans).
Observe that, with single-peaked preferences, the utility of militants in party
i = L,R increases as party i’s proposed q moves closer to its blisspoint q∗i .
Moreover, given that the weights used by both parties’ militants are increasing
in total income, that the Right party’s militants put a higher weight on the
utility of the richer individuals (as compared to the Left party’s militants) and
no weight on poor individuals, and that income effects are small, we obtain
qFB < q∗L < q∗R.20
Next, consider the utility of the opportunists, which depends upon two
important properties of our calibrated model. First, direct income effects
are “small” enough to ensure that q∗(θ, α) = eq (δ(θ, α),m(θ)) is increasing in
δ. Second, for a given qR, an increase in qL increases the proportion of the
electorate who prefer qL to qR. Yet, for a given qL, an increase in qR lowers
the proportion of the electorate who prefer qR to qL. We are now able to show:
20Recall that qFB is the most-preferred value of q under a utilitarian social welfare function
that sums the utilities of the entire population (with everyone receiving the same weight).
Result 1 The set of PUNEs consists of all (qL, qR) given by
q∗L ≤ qL < qR ≤ q∗R, (17)
and the point q∗L = qL = qR < q
∗
R.
Proof. To prove that any such configuration is a PUNE, consider the
implications of deviating from it. Observe first that the most-preferred policies
of the two parties’ militants (q∗L, q
∗
R) constitute, by definition, a PUNE: all
deviations from this pair of policy proposals would decrease the utility of the
militants in both parties. Now take any (qL, qR) such that (17) holds with
q∗L < qL, and consider how the factions in party L react to a decrease in qL.
This reduction would be supported by L’s militants, as it brings them closer to
their blisspoint. On the other hand, the opportunists in party L would oppose
this move: It decreases the party’s probability of winning by increasing the
proportion of citizens who prefer qL over qR. Similarly, take any (qL, qR) such
that (17) holds with qR < q∗R, and consider party R’s factions: Militants would
like to increase qR, while opportunists would prefer to decrease it.
Observe now that no configuration with q∗L < qL = qR can be a PUNE.
Starting from such a configuration, party L can increase both the utility of
the militants and the party’s probability of winning by decreasing qL (doing so
results in qMV < q∗L < qL < qR, so that πL jumps from 1/2 to a strictly higher
value). Finally, q∗L = qL = qR is also a PUNE: L’s militants oppose any devia-
tion from this point, while R’s opportunists block their party’s militants’ wish
to increase qR (such a change would drop the party’s probability of winning
from 1/2 discontinuously).
To prove that other configurations are not PUNEs, one must again consider
the implications of deviations from all such configurations. As an example,
consider qL ≤ q∗L < qR ≤ q∗R. In this case, both the militants and the oppor-
tunists in the Left party want to increase qL. Similar arguments rule out all
other configurations.
Observe first that the turnout probabilities play no role in the above result;
they affect the probability of winning for each PUNE but not the location
of the PUNEs. This remains true even if both parties use different turnout
probabilities (as long as every voter has a strictly positive turnout probability).
Moreover, since qMC < qMV < qFB < q∗L ≤ qL < qR ≤ q∗R,21 the Left party
21Observe that qMV is affected by the turnout probabilities, so that the fact that the
PUNEs call for taxes that are higher than (the subsidy) qMV depends on turnout probabil-
ities. For instance, this comparison wouldn’t hold if everybody except high income citizens
had a positive but negligible turnout.
always has a greater than 50% probability of winning the elections. Moreover,
the PUNEs always entail a higher-than-Pigouvian tax on the polluting good.
Table 1 reports the Left and the Right parties’ militants’ most-preferred values
of q − 1 for different values of α; the set of one-dimensional PUNE tax rates
consist of all qL− 1 < qR − 1 that lie between these reported tax rates. Three
observations follow from these numbers and the reported values for qMV−1 and
qMC−1, the majority-voting equilibrium values of q (adjusted and unadjusted
for turnout probabilities).
First, regardless of the value of α, PUNEs entail a tax, while the majority-
equilibrium values of q call for a subsidy (qMC as well as qMV ). That PUNEs
entail a tax is due to the fact that the militants in both parties put a higher
weight on the utility of richer citizens. That qMC and qMV call for a subsidy is
due to the positive skewness of both incomes distributions, with median wage
and capital incomes that are substantially lower than their respective average
incomes. This observation is particularly important in view of the magnitudes
involved. The lowest PUNE tax rate is 0.63. This is a massive tax on the
polluting good and is markedly higher than either qMC − 1 or qMV − 1, which
call for a subsidy. The upshot is that the one-dimensional-policy PUNEs are
basically dictated by the preferences of the militants of the two parties and
are far removed from the preferences of the majority of the electorate.
Our second observation is that q∗L and q∗R decrease with α, because of
the relative skewness of the two income distributions. Recall that q∗L and q
∗
R
correspond to the most-preferred values of q for individuals who are richer than
average. Increasing α implies that the wage income, which is less positively
skewed than capital income, is receiving a higher weight. This leads to lower
levels of most-preferred taxes for both parties’ militants.
Third, q∗L and q
∗
R are relatively close in values, particularly considering
how far apart they are from the values of qMC , qMV , qFB, and the existing
energy tax. Recall that the weights used by Democratic militants, ωL, are
proportional to income (see equation (15)), while weights used by Republican
militants, ωR, increase in income and assign a weight of zero to the poorest
individuals (equation (16)). Hence
q∗L = argmax
Z
γm(θ)V (q, α, θ)dF (θ),
which is independent of the value of the coefficient on income γ > 0. In turn,
this implies that the difference between the Democrats and the Republicans
does not come from the fact that Republicans are more sensitive to the income
of their constituents (as measured by the slope of the weight function (16)),
but rather because, according to Bartels (2002), they do not pay any attention
to individuals poorer than some threshold level.22 The fact that the difference
between q∗L and q
∗
R is very small, whatever the value of α, comes from the
observation that the set of voters who receive zero weight from the Republicans
is small. This corresponds, from (16), to all individuals with an income lower
than $11,100, representing 11.4% of the citizens and 9.1% of the voters.
5.3 Probabilistic voting
In order to compute the probabilistic-voting equilibrium, one needs informa-
tion on the bias distribution for every citizen type (in our setting, one’s type
is determined by his capital and labor incomes). In the absence of such infor-
mation, a possible shortcut is to fix the weights attributed by both parties to
each citizen type directly on the basis of some exogenous information. As an
example, suppose one believes that the density of unbiased voters is the same
at all levels of capital and labor income. This necessitates assigning the same
weight to all individual types. In this case, the parties maximizeZ
H
v(q, I(θ), Y )dF (θ),
where I(θ) is disposable income introduced in equation (1). The probabilistic
voting equilibrium proposal consists of the Pigouvian tax level whatever the
value of the budgetary rule α, as shown in Table 1.
Next assume that the frequency of unbiased voters of type θ corresponds
to this type’s probability of turnout. Bartels (2002) calculates this probabil-
ity to be strictly positive for an individual with zero income and to increase
linearly with one’s income until it reaches 100%. Table 1 reports the resulting
equilibrium tax rates for each value of α. Theses tax rates vary from 30% to
39%, depending on the value of α; they exceed the observed tax rates and the
Pigouvian tax (but not by as much as the PUNE tax rates).
A third possibility is to assume that the frequency of unbiased citizens,
φ(θ), corresponds to the weights attributed to the Left or the Right party’s
militants in the PUNE model, i.e. to the weights of Bartels (2002). Clearly,
using party L’s weights (equation (15)), the probabilistic voting equilibrium
yields q∗L. Similarly, using party R’s weights (equation (16)), the probabilis-
tic voting equilibrium yields q∗R. Then using convex combinations of Bartels’
weights for Democrats and Republicans, the probabilistic voting equilibria
22Results of Bartels (2002) suggest that Republicans put a negative weight on the poor’s
utility. As explained in the calibration section, however, we have imposed a lower bound of
zero on the weights.
spans precisely the interval between q∗L and q
∗
R. This is due to the fact that,
as one moves from the Democratic weights to the Republican weights along a
convex combination of both, the value of q that maximizes the corresponding
weighted sum of utilities increases monotonically from q∗L to q∗R. Thus, any
policy played by either party in a PUNE corresponds to a probabilistic voting
equilibrium with the density of unbiased voters among type θ citizens being
some convex combination of the Bartels’ weights for Democrats and Republi-
cans.
We have seen in the previous section that the very high value of q∗L is
due to the fact that the weight ωL increases with income, with no weight
assigned to voters with no income. We have also seen, when comparing q∗R
to q∗L, that he equilibrium tax rate increases further if one assigns a weight of
zero to low-income people and not just to those with no income. This raises
the following question: How does assigning a positive weight to voters with
no incomes change the equilibrium tax rates? To study this question, we next
assume that the weights φ(θ) are increasing in income and linear (affine, to be
precise). That is, we assume that parties maximizeZ
H
[ζ + γm(θ)] v(q, I(θ), Y )dF (θ),
where ζ and γ = 0 are constants (with at least one being strictly positive).
We then reduce the two degrees of freedom that we have in setting ζ and γ by
assuming that all weights schedules should pass through the point where the
weights schedules used by Democratic and Republican militants cross. The
utilitarian schedule and the linear schedule used by the Democratic militants
constitute two extreme cases of this family. The former assigns the same
positive weight (ζ > 0 and γ = 0) to everyone, resulting in qFB; while the
latter sets ζ = 0 and γ > 0, resulting in q∗L.
Table 1 reports the equilibrium tax rates for three intermediate cases cor-
responding to a small, a medium, and a large value of ζ. Figure 1 shows
these three intermediate schedules, together with the constant weights and
the weights used by Democratic and Republican militants.23 A larger value
of ζ (and thus lower value of γ) is associated more closely with an egalitarian
situation where the parties give the same weight to all citizens, i.e. to a per-
fectly representative democracy. Accordingly, we see from Table 1 that larger
values of ζ generate equilibria closer to the utilitarian/Pigouvian tax level.
We nevertheless find that even with a large ζ the equilibrium tax is very high,
exceeding 100% with α ≤ 0.25.
23The small value of ζ is one fourth the value that ζ takes with the utilitarian schedule.
The medium corresponds to one half, and the large intercept to three fourth; see Figure 1.
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Finally, we find that the equilibrium tax rate under probabilistic voting
decreases with α when weights are increasing in income. The reason for this
comparative statics result is linked to the relative skewness of the labor versus
capital income distributions, as explained in the previous section.
We conclude this section by pointing out a property that is shared by all
political economy equilibrium concepts studied in Table 1. When the equi-
librium concept yields a subsidy, as in the majority-voting equilibrium, both
qMC and qMV increase with α. On the other hand, when the equilibrium con-
cept yields a tax, as in the probabilistic voting equilibria and the PUNEs, the
solutions decrease with α. Consequently, increasing α moves the predicted
equilibrium tax rates of all our political models closer to the Pigouvian level
and to their actual observed values.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated if the existing energy taxes in the US can be
explained through political economy models. It has examined the predictions
of three competing models for the determination of energy taxes. The first is
the traditional Downsian majority-voting equilibrium approach which calls for
subsidizing energy goods. Intuitively, this follows from the facts that energy
taxes are regressive and income distribution is skewed to the right. The other
two models are the probabilistic-voting model, and Roemer’s (2001) model of
political competition with the “Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium” (PUNE)
as the equilibrium solution concept. In this latter setup, each party consists of
two factions: one cares about the policies (militants), and the other about the
probability of winning the election (opportunists). This approach incorporates
the realistic feature of the two parties offering distinct policy platforms. A
second important feature of our study is that our models have been calibrated
on the basis of the US data. The voters are U.S. households as represented
by the 2001 PSID survey, and the parameters of their utility function are
calculated using U.S. studies.
We have shown that while the majority-voting approach to political com-
petition leads to a massive subsidy on polluting goods, the probabilistic-voting
equilibrium and the PUNE approaches lead to a huge tax–much higher than
what one observes in the US economy. Our results suggest that, among the
three political approaches studied, the probabilistic model, wherein parties as-
sume that the proportion of unbiased voters is the same in all categories of
income, comes closest to explaining the observed US energy taxes.
We cannot, nevertheless, claim either that our probabilistic voting model
depicts reality, not by a long shot. There are three broad sets of reasons for this.
First, our economic model is incomplete; second, the political approaches we
have considered may not be the most appropriate ones; third, the calibration
exercise may be inadequate and needs improvement. As for the economic
model, we have made numerous simplifying assumptions and used only stylized
parameter values that are consistent with this particular model. Additionally,
our results rely on a postulated refund program which does not quite match
actual practice. Nor does one know if any portion of current energy taxes are
levied for environmental reasons. This suggests constructing a model that, in
addition to externality correction, accounts for the revenue raising role of the
tax system and incorporates the provision of public goods.
Second, our various models of the political decision making process may not
represent how environmental policy is made in the U.S. A better description
may be a political process that models the interaction between Congressional
committees, the various lobbying groups, and the unelected bureaucrats at the
Department of Energy. Observe also that the model we have developed in the
paper, is concerned with the choice of a single environmental tax rate. Political
models might perform better if environmental taxes were decided jointly with
other policy instruments (such as the choice of α in our framework). A better
understanding of how environmental policy is made is certainly needed.
Third, regarding calibrations, we lack a precise estimate of either the US
energy tax rate, the portion that may have been levied for environmental
reasons, or the Pigouvian tax rate (marginal social damages of pollution).
Using other estimates, or looking at some other energy taxes, not just gasoline,
actual and optimal tax rates might differ from each other.24 We have calibrated
the model using a value for the price elasticity of demand that is appropriate for
a static model with a one time change in the tax rate. One would expect that
demand elasticities for energy to vary over short and long term horizons. With
this in mind, it would be interesting to contrast our results with those that may
follow from a dynamic model with sequential voting, calibrated using short
term elasticities. Another problem is due to the specific weights we have used
in calculating the PUNEs and the probabilistic equilibria (i.e. Bartels (2002)
weights). The extremely high tax rates under PUNEs are essentially dictated
by the preferences of the militants in the Democratic and the Republican
parties, and especially by the fact that the militants in both parties put higher
weights on richer individuals’ preferences. More research is needed to enhance
our understanding of how the parties evaluate their constituents’ contribution
24It would be especially relevant to look at a pollutant that, unlike carbon, is not a global
pollutant.
to their own aspirations,25 and to their success in winning elections.
To conclude, a better understanding of how energy taxes are determined
is needed. Political economy models, at least those that we have studied, and
subject to the caveats we have mentioned, do not appear to tell the whole
story.
25As observed by a referee, the results of Bartels (2002)’s regressions are not strong. In
particular, the intercept–which plays a large role in our PUNE results–is not even close
to being statistically significant. If this intercept were zero, Republicans and Democrats
would have the same preferred tax policies. Additionally, the Bartels’ estimates come from
ideological responses of Senators to voter ideology, not from questions related directly to
the environment.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The first-order condition for the most-preferred level of q is given by
∂V (q;m, δ)
∂q
= a0(q) +mb0(q) + δ
£
b0(q)R(q) + b(q)R0(q)
¤
− ϕ0(y(q))y0(q) = 0.
(A1)
Observe that α enter this expression only through δ proving part (i). Differ-
entiating (A1) with respect to δ and q then yields equations (11)—(12) in the
text, where ∂2V (q, α, θ)/∂q2 < 0 by the concavity assumption (second-order
condition). This proves part (ii).
With quasi-linear preferences, d(q) = 0. Substituting in (11) yields:
deq
dδ
=
b(q)R0(q)
−∂2V (q, α, θ)/∂q2 > 0,
Consequently, eq increases with δ, which also implies that q∗ increases with r
and w (for a given value of α). To complete the proof it is then sufficient to
note that when b0(q) = 0 and δ = 1 (A1) reduces to
[ϕ0 − (q − 1)] y0(q) = 0
which yields q∗ = qF .
Calibrations of the parameters: Assuming that,½
a(q) = −a0q + 2a1+βa02 q2 −
2a1β
3
q3,
b(q) = 1− βq,
and given the indirect utility function (1) in the text, the demand function is
given by
y(q, I) = −∂v/∂q
∂v/∂I
=
−a0(q)
b(q)
− b
0(q)
b(q)
I
=
a0 − (2a1 + βa0)q + 2a1βq2
1− βq +
β
1− βqI
= a0 − 2a1q +
β
1− βqI. (A2)
It then follows from this equation that
∂y(q, I¯)
∂q
q
y¯
=
"
−2a1 +
µ
β
1− βq
¶2
I¯
#
q
y¯
, (A3)
∂y(q, I¯)
∂I¯
I¯
y(q, I¯)
=
β
1− βq
I¯
y¯
. (A4)
Next, using equations (A2)—(A4), and the following three pieces of infor-
mation,
(i) Consumer price of consumption goods= 1
Consumer price of energy=1
q = 1
I¯ = 59.9
y¯ = y(1, I¯) = 3.324,
where we have calculated y¯ = 3.324 from
y¯ = average expenditure on energy=
(ratio of average expenditure on energy to average income)
× (average income) =
0.0555× $59, 926 =
$3, 324,
(ii)
∂y(q, I¯)
∂q
q
y¯
= −0.3,
(iii)
∂y(q, I¯)
∂I¯
I¯
y(q, I¯)
= 0.40546,
we can calibrate the values of a0, a1, and β, by solving the following three
equations:
a0 − 2a1 +
β
1− β 59.9 = 3.324,"
−2a1 +
µ
β
1− β
¶2
59.9
#
1
3.324
= −0.3,
β
1− β
59.9
3.324
= 0.40546.
This yields β = 0.022, a0=3.003, and a1=0.513.
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